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NOTES
BANKRUPTCY - EXEMPTIONS - EFFECT ON STATE INSOLVENCY
LAws.-The recent case of Adrian State Bank of Adrian v. Klinkham-
mer 1 brings up the interesting question of the effect of the National
Bankruptcy Act (Section 4B) exempting farmers, wage earners, and
small debtors from involuntary proceedings thereunder, upon state
laws providing for involuntary insolvency proceedings. Thi case held
that while the National Bankruptcy Act was in force Chapter 90 of the
1 233 N. W. 588 (Minn. 1930).
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Minnesota Statutes is suspended and inoperative as to farmers because
it attempts to act within the field appropriated by Congress under the
Federal Act. The court said: To hold otherwise would circumvent the
purpose of Congress to protect the farmer from involuntary proceed-
ings. If we were to hold that this chapter (90) was inoperative merely
as to release of debtors, the insolvency act would be used for the pur-
pose of forcing farmers to take voluntary proceedings under the Feder-
al Act, thus doing indirectly what Congress did not intend to permit."
This case is supported by Foley Bean Lumber Company v. Sawyer,
2
which held that the statute of 1881 (Chapter 90 referred to above)
was a bankrupt law, not one regulating common law assignments for
the benefit of creditors, and was suspended by the enactment of the
Federal Act, since they both had the same object,--discharge of debt-
ors. This seems to afford a small,-in fact, very small,--projection
upon which to hang the foregoing decision.
Before we go further let us examine the wording of the National
Bankruptcy Act, Section 4B: "BANKRUPTS-WHO MAY BECOME.-
(b) Any natural person, except a wage earner, or a person engaged
chiefly in farming or tillage of the soil, any unincorporated company
and any moneyed, business or commercial corporation except a munici-
pal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation, owing debts to the
amount of one thousand dollars or over may be adjudged an involun-
tary bankrupt upon default or impartial trial and shall be subject to
all the provisions and entitled to all the benefits of this title."
The case of Little field v. Gay 3 was one where a small debtor, was
petitioned into insolvency by creditors, and decreed insolvent by the
state court. The particular proceeding was one to set aside a con-
veyance as a preference under the state insolvency law. It was held
that the plaintiff, assignee in insolvency of the debtor, had no standing
in court; that the state court had no jurisdiction to appoint him since
the National Bankruptcy Act being in force and effect, and exempting
small debtors from involuntary bankruptcy, the state law might not
be invoked. The court said: "The test of jurisdiction under the
state law does not rest on the volition of the debtor. If his person
and property are or may be subject to the bankrupt law then as to him
and his possessions the state insolvency law is in abeyance and power-
less." The court cites Ex Parte Eames,4 evidently following too liter-
ally the holding therein that when Congress, pursuant to its grant of
power in the Constitution (Article 1, Section 8, Subsection 4) acts to
2 78 N. W. 1038 (Minn. 1899).
8 52 AtI. 925 (Me. 1902).
4 Fed. Case No. 4237 (1874).
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establish a uniform rule on the subject of bankruptcy, all state laws be-
come suspended as far as all persons and cases within the purview of
the Federal laws are concerned.
The case of Littlefield v. Gay 5 was decided only a few years after
the passage of the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
The case of Oldfield Bank of Baltimore v. McCormick 6 decided the
following year, comes to a completely contrary result, seizing on the
phrase in Ex Parte Eames,7 "as far as all persons or cases within the
purview of the Federal Laws are concerned," as giving the key to the
solution of the problem of how to get at the persons or classes ap-
parently free from all coercion as to the payment of debts. Here
the plaintiff Bank filed a petition in insolvency under the Maryland
law, against a farmer, who pleaded lack of jurisdiction in the court
because the state insolvency law had been superceded by passage of
the National Bankruptcy Act. The plaintiff's demurrer to this plea,
though overruled below, was sustained here. The court uses as a
foundation for its decision several quotations from leading cases.
Chief Justice Marshall, in Sturges v. Crowninshields says: "The
fact that Congress has the Constitutional power to establish uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcy does not in itself inhibit the states
from passing valid insolvent laws. It is not the existence, but the
exercise of the power which is incompatible with the exercise of the
same power by the states." The court also uses the principle, set
out in Ex Parte Eames 9 and in Ogden v. Saunders,10 that the power
of Congress to pass uniform bankruptcy laws does not exclude the
right of the states to legislate on the same subject, except when the
state law conflicts with those of Congress. The theory of the court
is that there is no conflict here, and that the Federal Law excludes
members of the three classes. The express exclusion of the defendant
from the Federal Act is presumed to give the state legislature authority
to cause their acts to apply to him, since it could never have been the
intent of Congress to take from creditors of farmers, wage earners and
small debtors their rights to secure an equal distribution of the debtor's
assets. "If the remedy is not found in the Federal Act, it will not
be presumed that Congress intended to take away the remedy provided
by the states." I
The power to enact insolvency laws is primarily in the states and
may only be taken from them by the establishment of the Federal
5 Op. cit. supra note 3.
6 53 AtI. 934 (Md. 1903).
7 Op. cit. supra note 4.
8 4 L. Ed. 529 (Mass. 1817).
9 Op. cit. supra note 4.
10 6 L. Ed. 606 (La. 1824).
11 Sturges v. Crowninshield, op. dt. supra note 10.
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system in conflict with the state law. But here the three classes are
excluded from the operation of the important feature of the Federal
Act. "How can it be said that an express failure to legislate, an
exclusion, raises a conflict?" 12
From Rhode Island comes another step in the development of the
law. In the case of Lace v. Smith 13 a farmer was held subject to the
state insolvency law, because being such, he was expressly' excluded
from the National Bankruptcy Act, and it was held there was no
conflict between the state and Federal laws, although the door to the
privileges of the Federal Act was left open as to the three classes,
farmers, wage earners, and small debtors, so that they might avail
themselves of its advantages if they so desire.
Pitcher v. Standish 14 progressed still further. A farmer was de-
creed insolvent by a state court, and he appealed on the ground that
the state statute being suspended by the enactment of the National
Bankruptcy Act, the state court has no jurisdiction. A demurrer by
the petitioner was sustained and the appeal dismissed. The impor-
tant point made in this case is that what has been done by Congress
in regard to these classes does not and was never intended to amount
to a complete control over that entire subject, and the court criticizes
Littlefleld v. Gay 15 for holding that the legislation of the Federal Act
in regard to the insolvency of farmers, wage earners, and small debt-
ors amounts to complete control over the whole subject. "Whatever
cases are expressly excepted from the operation of the National Bank-
ruptcy Act, or lie outside the reach of its provisions are subject to
state regulations which are supreme except as restricted by the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Act. The field of restriction cannot be broader
than the operation of the National Bankruptcy Act." 16
Congress, though leaving the door of voluntary bankruptcy open to
these classes, expressly excluded them from the Federal Act, intended
to do so and intended not to cover the entire field but to leave it
open to regulation by the states. The primary object of the Bankrupt
Acts and insolvency laws is the prevention of frauds on creditors and
it may not be presumed that Congress intended to deny this protec-
tion to creditors of farmers, wage earners, and small debtors.
The question resolves itself into the apparent intention of Congress,
and though the case of In Re Doroski 17 gives down the dictum that
12 Sturges v. Crowninshield, op. dt. supra note 10.
13 82 AtI. 268 (R. I. 1912).
14 98 AtI. 93 (Conn. 1916).
15 Op. cit. supra note 3.
16 Pitcher v. Standish, op. cit. supra note 14, at p. 95.
17 271 Fed. 8. (E. D. of N. Y. 1921).
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"The intent of Congress to protect men engaged in agriculture who
might fall behind from the failure of crops for one or two seasons has
always been recognized as the basis for this provision" (meaning
National Bankruptcy Act, Section 4B), citing no authority therefor;
still the Minnesota court displays a perhaps pardonable excess of
zeal in coming to the aid of the farmer.
B. R. Desenberg.
HIGHWAYS-CONFLICT BETWEEN STATUTE AND CITY ORDINANCE-
POLICE PowER.-An interesting controversy arises when a state
through the enactment of a statute fixes a maximum rate of speed for
its highways; and a city, by virtue of its police power, prohibits a
speed exceeding a lower rate than that permitted by the statute. It
is frequently insisted that the city ordinance supersedes the state law.
In dealing with the problem, it is necessary to first consider the
grounds for such a contention.
Public highways and streets are intended for the purpose of travel.'
The power to control the use-of highways is found primarily in the
state legislatures.2 However, this body may, delegate some of its gov-
emmental powers to municipalities, and whatever it may do in the
regulation and control of streets and highways, it may delegate to
municipalities.3 Judge Dillon says: "The primary fundamental idea
of a municipal corporation is an agency to regulate and administer
the internal concerns of a defined locality peculiar to the place incor-
porated, or at all events not common to the State or public at large." 4
Being a creature of the legislature, and deriving its *powers from that
body, it is logical, that a municipal corporation may exercise only the
powers included in its charter.5 But the legislative power is not lost
1 Huddy On Automobiles (7th Ed.), p. 33; Tooke, Cases On Municipal Cor-
porations (1931 Ed.) p. 338.
2 Huddy, op. dt. supra note 1, p. 49; 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations,
§ 656; 29 C. J. 646.
3 Huddy, op. cit. supra note 2; 29 C. J. 646.
4 1 Dillon, Municipal Corp. (3rd Ed.), § 218; Elliott, The Law Of Roads
and Streets, p. 326; 19 R. C. L. p. 800.
5 "It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal cor-
poration possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First,
those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or
incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplish-
ment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation,-not simply con-
venient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the
existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power
is denied. Of every municipal corporation the charter or statute by which it is
created is its organic act. Neither the corporation nor its officers can do any act,
or make any contract, or incur any liability, not authorized thereby, or by some
legislative act applicable thereto. All acts beyond the scope of the powers granted
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by a delegation of it to a municipality. The state may resume its ab-
solute control, unless constitutional provisions obstruct this use of
legislative power. 6
A municipality, by virtue of its police power, may regulate the use
of streets by motor vehicles.7 But an ordinance enacted under legis-
lative authority comes within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution which prohibits any state from depriving
anyone of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.8 More-
over, to be enforceable, a municipal ordinance must be reasonable, 9
and cannot infringe rights guaranteed by state constitutions. Nor can
it be a valid exercise of power if it conflicts with a statute and forbids
what a legislature has expressly licensed or permits what the legislature
has forbidden.10 "The books and reported cases seem to agree that
courts may declare void an ordinance passed by a city or village by
virtue of its implied powers, if, in -the opinion of the court, it is unrea-
sonable; but when the ordinance is passed by express authority con-
ferred upon the municipality by the legislature, such power is not so
clear, and there is a conflict of authority upon that proposition." "I
In disposing of the problem whether or not the city ordinance super-
sedes the statute, unquestionably the terms "highways" and "streets"
have presented much confusion. The term "highway" is a very com-
prehensive one, and capable of many different meanings. "High-
ways" 12 is a generic name for all kinds of public ways and may in-
clude, public ways of every description-canals, streets, footways,
ferries, bridges, and rivers.1 3
The purpose of a street is primarily the same, that of public travel.
"In strictness a street is a paved, macadamized, or graveled public
way, belonging to the State as one of its highways, but ordinarily the
word 'street' is employed as meaning any way set apart for the public
use in a city, town, or village, whether improved or not." 14 Although
are void. Much less can any power be exercised, or any act done, which is for-
bidden by charter or statute. These principles are of transcendent importance,
and lie at the foundation of the law of municipal corporations." 1 Dillon, Mun.
Corp. (5th Ed.), § 237. See also, St. Paul v. Robinson, 129 Minn. 383, 152 N. W.
777 (1915); Chicago v. Kluever, 257 I11. 317, 100 N. E. 917 (1913).
6 Huddy, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 62.
7 Watts v. Montgomery Tr. Co., 175 Ala. 102, 57 So. 471 (1912); Chicago
v. Kluever, op. cit. supra note 5; McIntosh v. Johnson, 211 N. Y. 265, 105 N. E.
414 (1914); City of Oshkosh v. Campbell, 151 Wis. 567, 139 N. W. 316 (1913).
8 19 R. C. L. 803.
9 Huddy, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 69.
10 Mendel v. Dorman, 202 Ky. 29, 258 S. W. 936 (1924); 19 R. C. L. p. 803.
11 Tooke, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 212.
12 Bovier's Law Dictionary, Vol. 1., p. 447.
18 Highways, 29 C. J. 364.
14 Elliott, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 13.
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the purpose for which streets and highways are established is the same,
it may be said that all streets are highways, although all highways are
not streets. And rules which apply to one cannot be said to apply to
another.
That legislatures confer on local and municipal authorities power
of control is a recognized fact. Thus when the state and cities attempt
at the same time to exercise control over thoroughfares, the law would
permit one to invade the jurisdiction of the other, and it is difficult
in many instances to determine just what jurisdiction is intended by
the legislature to be exclusive. Courts, to prevent a conflict of author-
ity, have favored a construction of statutes permitting each jurisdiction
to have exclusive control of its own highways. For instance, in Illi-
nois,15 Tennessee,1 6 Texas,17 and Indiana,' 8 it has been held the gen-
eral statutes applying to "public highways" do not apply to streets of
an incorporated town or city. On the other hand, the term "highways"
has been construed as including "streets" of incorporated villages and
cities.' 9 Some automobie acts passed by various states define the
terms.
20
It is regretted that the term "highways" is not more accurately
used in statutes and decisions. No set rule in regard to the term can
be given; "Its construction depends upon the intent as determined by
the context." 21
Weighing the rule just quoted, it is evident that much confusion
and danger as already indicated exists in many jurisdictions. It is
generally sustained that municipalities may enact rules to regulate
the use of streets within their limits, but such ordinances are ineffective
when they are in conflict with state statutes.22 However, in dealing
15 People ex rel Seippe v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 118 ll. 520 (1886).
16 Cowan's Case, 1 Overt 311.
17 State v. Jones, 18 Tex. 874 (1857). See also, 96 Tex. Crim Rep. 3, 255
S. W. 730 (1923); Lamar & Smith v. Stroud, 5 S. W. (2d) 824 (Ct. of Civ.
App. of Tex. 1928).
18 Indianapolis v. Croas, 7 Ind. 9 (1855). See also, 169 Ind. 265, 82 N. E.
459 (1907) ; State v. Amos, 76 Fla. 26, 79 So. 433 (1918).
19 Burns v. Kendall, 96 S. C. 385, 80 S. E. 621 (1914); Hall v. Compton,
108 S. W. 1122 (Mo. 1908); West v. City of Asbury Park, 99 AUt. 190 (N. J.
1916).
20 Huddy, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 17.
21 Highways, 29 C. J. 363.
22 Alabama: Hood & Wheeler Furniture Co. v. Royal, 76 So. 965 (1907);
Alder v. Martin, 59 So. 597 (1912). California: Ex Parte Daniels, 192 Pac.
442 (1920). See also, Ham v. Los Angeles County, 189 Pac. 462 (1920). Georgia:
Jones v. Stokes, 89 S. E. 1078 (1916). Illinois: Chicago v. Kluever, 109 N. E. 917
(1913); Heartt v. Downers Grove, 115 N. E. 869 (1917). Kentucky: Mendel v.
Dorman, 202 Ky. 29 (1924). Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Newhall, 91 N. E.
206 (1910). Minnesota: Park v. Duluth, 159 N. W. 627 (1916). Missouri: Roper
v. Greenspon, et al., 129 S. W. 1107 (1917). Nebraska: Christensen v. Tate, 128
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with the conflict between the statute and city ordinance, three divisions
of construction are followed. Whether a conflict exists or not may
turn, (1) on the charter powers of a municipality, (2) on the peculiar
language of the statute, (3) where a statute expressly forbids munici-
palities from enacting ordinances on the subject.
It is insisted, in some jurisdictions, that the rights of a municipality
cannot be assaulted by a legislature. The argument is advanced on
the theory that the police power granted municipalities is a limitation
on the power of the legislature. 23 It is further argued, that the power
inherent in every municipality to protect life and insure public safety
will support all reasonable ordinances adopted by the proper authori-
ties for the regulation of public streets. 24 Such jurisdictions are reluc-
tant to interfere with the authority of a municipality.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in the decisions of Owen v.
Tulsa,25 and Mitchell v. Carter,26 held that in municipal matters the
charter superseded the general laws. Notwithstanding these decisions
it was held in Ex parte Shaw,2 7 a case decided by the same court,
that the state laws regulating traffic controlled local ordinances in con-
flict therewith.
In Kalick v. Knapp 2 8 it was held that when a city was granted
power to regulate its affairs, the legislature could not repeal or amend
that power. However, in Lovejoy v. Portland,2 9 decided about six years
later, it seems that the law of the previous case was changed, and the
power of the legislature to pass general laws affecting municipalities
was upheld.
Under the general welfare statutes, it is contended that an ordinance
is valid on the ground that it creates and defines an offense against
the municipality, and the state law creates a different offense against
the state, even though the act be the same.30
N. W. 622 (1910). New York: People v. Braun, 166 N. Y. S. 708 (1917). North
Carolina: State v. Freshwater, 111 S. E. 161 (1922). Ohio: Goldie Schneiderman
v. Barbara Sesanstein, 167 N. E. 138 (1929). Rhode Island: State v. Thurston,
66 Atl. 580 (1907). West Virginia: State ex rel. Constanzo v. Robinson, 104 S. E.
473 (1920). Wisconsin: Baraboo v. Dwyer, 165 N. W. 297 (1917); Oshkosh V.
Campbell, 139 N. W. 316 (1913).
23 State ex rel. Mullins v. Port of Astoria, 154 Pac. 399 (Or. 1916).
24 Taylor v. Roberts, 94 So. 874 (Fla. 1922).
25 111 Pac. 320 (Old. 1910).
26 122 Pac. 691 (Old. 1912).
27 157 Pac. 900 (1916).
28 142 Pac. 594 (Okl. 1914).
29 188 Pac. 207 (Or. 1920); Rose v. Portland, 162 Pac. 498 (Or. 1917).
30 Lawrenceburg v. Wuest, 16 Ind. 337 (1861); Town of Avoca v. Heller, 129
Ia. 227 (1905); DeSota v. Brown, 44 Mo. App. 148 (1891).
Contra: Adams v. Albany, 29 Ga. 56 (1859); State v. Bums, 11 So. 878 (La.
1893); State v. McCoy, 21 S. E. 690 (N. C. 1895); Canton v. Mist, 9 Ohio St.
439 (1859); 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59.
